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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARL BALDWIN and LARRY GLEIM,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)

vs.

)

CASE NO.

18202

)

VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
Corporation,

)
)
)

Defendant~Respondent~

)
)

STATEMENT ·oF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The nature of this case is a dispute over the terms of
an oral agreement to convey land, with ap.pellants seeking to
rescind the agreement because of the failure of respondent to
comply with the terms of the agreement.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
In February of 1981 appellants filed an amended complaint
against respondent seeking the recovery of amounts paid under an
oral contract to convey land.
four causes of action.

This complaint sought recovery under

First, that respondent breached the con-

tract; second, that the oral contract is unenforceable and subject
to rescission because it falls within the statute of frauds;
third, that respondent has been unjustly enriched; and fourth,
that appellants were induced to enter the sales agreement through
fraudulent statements and misrepresentations.
After a non-jury triai the Court ·held that appellants
did not carry their burden of proof in establishing that one of the
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terms of the agreement was an enforceable commitment

of respondent

to provide construction financing to appellants; that the oral
agreement was removed from the statute of frauds by part performance; that appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing
proof that respondent made a fraudulent representation; and
that respondent is entitled to a foreclosure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse
the Trial Court's decision and award appellants rescission of
the agreement and restitution.
PREFATORY 'NOTE
Upon counsel's request, the court reporter transcribed
the trial record into the official trial transcript.

However,

counsel 1 s closing arguments were not transcribed at that time.
Upon further request of counsel the portion of the record containing the closing arguments was transcribed and made a part of
the record on appeal.

The page numbering in this supplemental

portion of the transcript begins with number one.

Therefore,

in order to di.stinguish it from the main portion of the trial
transcript~

the supplemental portion will be identified as

"Tr. 2d".
STATEMENT OF 'THE FACTS
In April of 1978 the appellants~ Carl Baldwin and Larry

Gleim, met with an employee of the defendant, Vantage Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Vantage) to discuss the purchase of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

building lots from Vantage (Tr. pp. 10, 59).

The employee of

Vantage with whom the appellants met was Doug Boulton (Tr. pp. 11,

59).

The appellants, as licensed general contractors wanted to

purchase a number of building lots located in a newly developed
Subdiv~sion

Utah County

known as Blackhawk Estates Subdivision

(Tr. pp. 9, 10, 60, 77).

At that time Vantage owned about 62

lots in Plat "D" of this subdivision (Tr. pp. 78).
During the month of April, 1978, the parties met on three
separate occasions and as a· result of these meetings, appellants
agreed to purchase from Vantage SEVEN (7) particular building lots
in Plat

11

Du of Blackhawk Estates Subdivision (Tr. pp. 14 and 43).

These SEVEN _{7) lots are numbers, 18, 19, 28, 34, 35, 49 and 58
(Tr. p . 43)

~

This agreement was made orally and no contracts of

sale or any other memoranda were signed by appellants (Tr. pp .. 15,
17, and 7.3).

No written sales contracts, earnest money agreements,

trust deed notes, trust deeds or similar documents were produced at
trial {Tr. PPo 1 - 124).
The terms of the sales agreement were discussed and agreed
upon during the three meetings in

Apr~l

of 1978.

When the appellants

first met with Doug Boulton, they met in a Deseret Federal Savings
and Loan (hereinafter referred to as Deseret Federal) office
located in Orem, Utah

(Tr~

pp. 11, 59).

this first meeting were Larry

~leim~

and Gary Mayo {Tr. pp. 11, 59,

84)~

The persons present at

Carl Baldwin, Doug Boulton
Mr~

Mayo was an employee of

Deseret Federal and he introduced appellants to Doug Boulton
{Tr. p. 84).

The second meeting in April of 1978 took place in

Doug Boulton's office, which is located in one of Deseret Federal's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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offices in Salt Lake City.

The persons present at this time

were Carl Baldwin, Larry Gleim and Doug Boulton (Tr. pp. 14, 59).
The third time the parties met the peo'ple present were Larry Gleim
and Doug Boulton and again they met in Doug Boulton's office in
Salt Lake City ('Tr . .p. 61) . All three of the principal parties to
the agreement, Larry Gleim, Carl Baldwin and Doug Boulton, appeared
at trial and testifi.ed as to the terms of the agreement.
Both appellants testified that one of the fundamental
terms of the agreement was that construction loans and long term
financing would be provided by Deseret

Federal~

Specifically,

Doug Boulton guaranteed that Deseret Federal would provide the
construction financing for homes built on the lots

if~

appellants

purchased the lots (Tr. pp .. 12, 13., 14, 51, 24, 37, 38, 59, 60, 63,

65, 66, 67, 69, and

70)~

This guarantee was a fundamental term

of the oral agreement and without it, appellants would not have
entered the contracts to purchase the lots (Tr. pp. 24, 65).

All

of the testimony concerning this aspect of the agreement will be
discussed in the argument portion of this brief under issue number
one.

Lt is sufficient here to state that the testimony of Doug

Boulton indi.cates he does not remember specifically tbE! statements
which he made to appellants in April of 1978.

Most of the other

terms of the agreement are not di.sputed ..
When the parties concluded the contract negotiations,
appellants paid Vantage the sum of $8, 950. 00 as the down payment on
all SEVEN (7) lots (Tr. p. 61)..

This amount represents TEN PERCENT

(10%) of the purchase price for each lot.

Lots 18, 19, and 28 had

a purchase.price of $13,500.00 each and lots 34, 35, 49 and 58 had
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a purchase price of $12,500.00 each (Tr. p. 43) (See also
defendant's Exhibit 5).
The amount of interest accruing on the unpaid balance
of the purchase price for each lot is not disputed.

The parties

agreed that interst on the unpaid balance would start accruing
at ELEVEN PERCENT (11%) per annum, from the time power was available to each lot.

This interest rate of ELEVEN PERCENT (11%) was

to increase to THIRTEEN PERCENT {13%) per annum after one year
(Tr. pp. 5, 9, 12, 103,

104)~

Some time after the down payment was made, appellants
began receiving monthly statements requiring the payment of the
accrued interest on the balance of purchase price.

Appellants

testified that the original agreement did not require them to ·
p~y

the interest

monthly~

Rather, this interest was to be paid

upon the sale of each home constructed on the lot (Tr .. pp. 17, 18,
19, 62).

However, in January of 1979, and at the request of Van-

tage, appellants paid Vantage the sum of $4,278.,59.

This amount

paid all of the accrued interest o.n each of the SEVEN ( 7) lots
through January 31, 1979 {TR. pp. 100, 101) (See also defendant's
Exhibit number 5 and plaintiff s Exhibit number 2).
1

Later in 1979,

and at the request of Vantage,, appellants again paid the accrued
intere.st on each lot {Tr. pp . . 20 ,. 103).

This payment, made in

June of 1979 and in the amount of $2,990.32, paid the accrued
interest through May 3'1, 197.9 {See also plaintiffs f Exhibit 3
and defendant's Exhibit 5).
Appellants chose not to build houses on three of the
lots and in the later part of 1979, sold Lots 28, 49 and 58 to
third parties {Tr.. pp.. 21, 22) ..

Upon the sale of each of these
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lots the balance of the purchase price, together with the accrued
interest was fully paid (Tr. pp. 21, 22) (See also defendant's
Exhibit 5).

Also upon the sale of each of these lots the

documents necessary to clear title to the purchasers were executed
(Tr. pp. 22, 91, 92).

As to the remaining FOUR (4) lots, numbers

18, 19, 34 and 35, the appellants did not sign any written contract
or other documents or memoranda (Tr. pp. 15, 17, 23, 73).
In February of 1980 appellants went to the Orem off ice of
Deseret Federal and met with a loan officer named LaRae Pittman.
At that time appellants inquired about obtaining construction loans
to build homes on Lots 34 and 35 (Tr. pp. 24, 63).

In response to

this appellants were denied a loan application and were told that
Deseret Federal was not offering construction loans for homes
built on speculation (Tr.

P~

24).

Appellants then explained to

the loan officer that construction loans were guaranteed to them,
under a previous arrangement with Doug Boulton (Tr. pp. 25, 63).
The loan officer then called Mr. Preben Nielsen, a senior vicepresi.dent and manager of Vantage (Tr. pp. 111, 112).

Mr. Nielsen

indicated that he would speak with the person in charge of mortgage lending and find out what the situation was with regards to
construction financing .(Tr. pp. 25, 117).

Appellants then left

the Deseret Federal office ..
Following this incident in February of 1980; appellants
contacted Deseret Fedearl on several occasions to make further
inquiry about obtaining construction financing (Tr. pp. 26, 27, 63)
These communications culminated in the summer of 1980 with a person
meeting between appellants and two representatives of Deseret
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Federal.

This meeting was held in Mr. Preben Nielsen's office

in Salt Lake City (Tr. p. 116).

The persons present at this

meeting were Carl Baldwin, Larry Gleim, Preben Nielsen and John
Cecil.

Mr. Cecil is an accountant for Deseret Federal (Tr. p. 97).

The substance of the discussion at the meeting is that appellants
were informed that it was not possible for Deseret Federal to
extend construction loans to

them~

In response to this, appellants

requested that Vantage return to them the down payment and interest
which they paid on Lots 18, 19, 34 and 35.
denied.

This request was

Other possible arrangements were discussed but they

were not acceptable to appellants {Tr. pp. 2, 64, 110, 115, and
116).
Following this meeting, appellants contacted an attorney,

Mr. Ray M. Harding, Jr.

1

and requested him to try and obtain a

rescission of the sales contracts on the lots and to get their
money back {Tr. pp. 29, 64) •. In December of 1980 appellants filed
a complaint against Vantage seeking rescission of the Sales contracts for Lots 18, 19, 34, and 35 and restitution .
.ARGUMENT

POINT I.
A.

THE.COURT.ABUSED 'ITS DISCRETION 'IN.FINDING .. THAT
mr-:-GUARANTEE ·oF CONSTRUCTION .FINANCING WAS 'MADE-..

Scope ·of ·Review
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of Utah

states that an appeal to the Supreme Court may be on questions
of both law and fact in equi.ty cases,

In the present case, appellants' amended complaint
specifically prays for resci.ssion and restitution.

This case is
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therefore an equitable action and as such the Supreme Court may
review the facts as well as the law.

Upon a review of the facts,

this court may make new findings of fact when the evidence so
clearly preponderates against the trial court's findings that a
manifest injustice has been done.

Hatch v. Bastion, 567 P 2d 1100

(Utah, 1977), Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P 2d 811
(1972).

It is appellant's position that a review of the facts will

establish that a manifest injustice has been done, requiring a
reversal of the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
Bo

Evidence establishing guararttee.
As noted in the statement of facts there were only three

people who were involved in the contract negotiations which
resulted in the agreement whereby appellants agreed to purchase
SEVEN (7) lots from Vantage.

These three people are the appellants

Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim, and a representative of Vantage and
Deseret Federal, Doug Boulton..

All three of these people appeared

at trial and testified about the contract negotiations, including
the guarantee of Construction financing.

Therefore~

the evidence

which establi.shes whether the guarantee was made must come from
the testimony of appellants and Doug Boulton.

Appellants maintain

that the testimony of these three witnessess, taken together,
establishes with certainty that a guarantee of construction financing was made to appellants.
In an effort to avoid any mis-statement of the evidence,
and in support of their position, appellants submit the follow~ng
excerpts from the trial transcript:
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On direct examination, Carl Baldwin testified as follows:
Page 12, lines 2-16,

Q.

(By Mr. Harding)

In this conversation that you

had, was any discussion had of guarantees?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And can you tell me specifically what was said

and by whom in regards to guarantees?
A.

We asked that if we could purchase these lots, that

loans would be guaranteed through Deseret Federal.
that

ye~

It was answered

they would be.

Q.

Who gave that answer_?

A.

Doug Boulton.

Q.

This was in

A.

Yes.

the~

first meeting that you had?

They reason why we asked the question was

that if we went to any other bank besides Deseret Federal, the
loans would have to be paid off and that there would be no subordination.
Page 13, lines 4 through 7.

Q.

Okay.

As you were answering or contemplating the

purchase of these lots, wh.tii.kth of these terms that proposed to you
were the most important to you?
A.

That we were guaranteed a loan,

Page 14, lines 10-18 and 23-30

Q.

What, specifically, what was said, though, in regard

to the terms, and who by?
A.

At that time I remember saying to Doug, "Is our loans

guaranteed for sure_?

Because. if they are not, then we'd have to

go to other financing and those lots would have to be paid off
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in full."

He said, "Yes".

He says that Deseret Federal, the

reason why they were doing this was that they wanted the construction money to go through them and also the long-term financing, if possible.
Lines 23 through 30

Q.

Onee

~gai~what

particulars in regards to sub-

ordination were discussed at this meeting?
A.

Well, the subordination was that, as I mentioned,

that De.seret Federal, as I asked the question, "Are you sure that
Deseret Federal would make those loans?
Doug said, "Yes".

Is that guaranteed?

And I mentioned that that was the purpose,

because if it wasn't then we would have to go somewhere else
and we'd have to pay off the lots.
Page 23 lines 29-30 and page 24, lines 1-9

Q.

(By Mr. Harding) What statements of Mr. Boult0n

did. you rely upon in making the purchase?
THE COURT:

Q.

If any.

{By Mr. Harding) - - If any?

MR. GARRETT:

I'm also going to object to it being

repetitious, he's covered this ground, your Honor.
THE COURT:
A.

He may answer.

The thing that was so important to us was the guarante

of loan, the subordination and the reasonable interest ..
On cross examination, Mr. Baldwin testified as follows:
Page 37, lines 21-29

Q.

All right.

Isn't it a fact that when you went to

Mr. Boulton about the purchase of lots and discussed financing,
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all he ever really said to you was that Deseret Federal or Vantage
would like the construction loan and the permanent financing,
if it were possible; wasn't that what he said to you?
A.

No, that's not what. he said to me.

Q.

Is that a possibility that that's what he said:

A.

No, that is not a possiblity, because we made .

Page 38, lines 6 - 12
A.

Yes.

In the conversation Lhat we had with Doug

Boultcin, I asked specifically if that money was guaranteed.
Q.

Well, did you mean that it would be guaranteed to

you under all conditions.1
A.

It was never di.scussed.

We went out there with

the feeling thc:.t if we wanted to build a home, that that financing
was available.
On Direct Examination, appellant Larry Gleim testified as
follows:
Page 59, ones 12-16
A.

. .. .. We discussed tli"a-t Deseret Federal' s position

as lending institution, and we were told at that time that we
would be granted or guaranteed construction loans on those lots.
Q.

Who told you this.1

A.

Doug Boultona

Page 60, lines 16-25
Q~

Did you rely upon any of the statements of Doug

Boulton in these two meetings and consumating the sale or in
agreeing to purchase these lots2
A.

Totally ..

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q.

Which of the terms were important to you in deciding

to purchase the lots?
A.

The low down payment of ten percent was appealing,

and that they would guarantee us a construction loan when we were
ready to build homes on those lots, and they would subordinate the
homes that we would build.
Page 65, lines 10-13

Q.

Would you have agreed to purchase the lots from

Vantage Corporation had they not guaranteed construction financing?
A.

No, not with the materials thE!Y had.

On cross examination Mr. Gleim testified as
Page 66, lines 19-30 and page 67,

Q.

l~ne

follows~

1

Mr. Gleim, you testified generally concerning some

conversations· you had with Mr. Boulton concerning a guarantee,
you used the word "guarantee," is. that correct?
A.

Yes,

Q.

Did Mr. Boulton use the word "guarantee"?

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

And his statement to you then is that he would

I

did.

guarantee construction loan financing, is that right1
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And he meant

by that, to your knowledge, that you

could go in and get that loan any time· you wanted in the future,
is that right?
A.

That's right.

These excerpts illustrate the clarity of appellants
testimony.

Both Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim remember the c~ntract
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negotiations in detail and were able to explain their position
and expectations clearly under direct and cross examination.
In addition, there is nothing in the testimony of either
appellant which suggests inconsistency or unreirabiliity.

Therefore,

any evidence upon which the trial court could have based its
finding that Vantage did not make a guarantee of construction
financing, must be found in the testimony of other witnesses.
The only other party to the contract negotiations is
Doug Boulton.

Mr. Boulton testified as one of appellants witnesses

and his testimony indicates that he remembers very little about
specific statements that were made.

However, many of hJis statements

support the testimony of Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim.

Appellants

call particular attention to the following excerpts from Mr. Boulton 1 s
testimony:
On direct examination Mr. Boulton testified as follows:
Page 78, lines 20-30, and page 79, lines 1-2

Q.

Do you recall whether or not you actually said,

"I guarantee construction financing"?

Do you recall your words

in the conversation so that you know whether or not you said that?

A..

I--you've got to remember this has been a couple of

years ago, and I can't recall of saying it, just to be honest.

Q... Okay..
A.

Do you recall not saying it?
1

It's--We used to have a lot of these for, I don t

mean to say from your question, but we used to of course offer this
to builders if they met the requirements and done the buildling
in a timely manner.

But I, it's hard for--

On cross examination, Mr .. Boulton testified as follows:.
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Page 86, lines 8-17

Q.

Now it's important here, Mr. Boulton, when we

talk about this matter of construction loan:

I believe you

indicated that you do not recall using the word "guarantee" to
these people in any of your conversations, is that correct?
A.

No.

Q.

Would you have used that term to a purchaser?

A.

Well, I really didn't have any authority to do so,

but I could have by, I may have sometime, I can't say, Ed, I don't
like to say that unless we have it in writing it doesn 1 t really
mean anything to me, but I-Page 88, lines 13-18

Q.

Do I understand correct then that it would not be

either within your authority or within your training and background to make anybody a guarantee that you would make a loan in
the future.?

A.

No.

I only think we did that with our better

bu il de111 s .
In contrast to the statements quoted above, there is
some testimoy of Mr. Boulton whi.ch does not support that of appella1
However, these statements are inconclusive when standing alone.
Moreover, when viewed together with the rest of

his testimony ,

and with the testimony of appellants, these statements are equivoca:
and inconsistent as well as inconclusive.
The only thing that i.s certain about Mr.. Boulton 1 s
testimony is that he cannot remember whether he used the word
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"guarantee" in the contract negotiations with appellants.

This

however, is not the same thing as saying that he did not make
a guarantee.

An example of this legal principal is found in

McClellan v. David, 84 Nev. 283, 439 P 2d 673 (1968).

There the

trial court granted the defendant's motion to set aside a default
judgment.

On appeal, the Supreme Court pointed out that one

witness, Mrs. Troxel, clearly recalled three critical conversations
while the defendant, David, stated that he did not recall the
same conversations.

In

re~ersing

the order to set aside the

default the Supreme Court noted the effect of David's testimony
when viewed in light of Mrs. Troxel's testimony:
Her testimony was not impeached in the slightest.
David did not deny these conversations. He simply
said he did not recall them. Accordingly, there is
not fundamental conflict in this testimony requiring
us to adhere to the trial court's finding.in favor
of respondent on this issues . . . T~sttimony of a
witness that he ·does not .·remember ·whether a ·certain
event took ·21ace.does.rtot.coritradict.positive.testi. morty that ·such ·event ·or ·conversatio~took_..Elace.
439 P Zd 67~ 677. (emphasis added).
Thus, Mr. Boulton's testimony as to the contract negotiations and the terms agreed upon does not contradict appellants
assertion that Vantage did guarantee construction loans to

them~

In addition to the absence of contradictory statements, Mr .. Beul ton• s

testimony corroborates appellant!s testimony in some

instances~

In reference to guarantees, Mr. Boulton stated on Page 78

that Vantage

11

use to of course offer this to builders.lf

Mr .. Boulton

also testified on page 88 that Vantage was in the practice of
making guarantees of construction financing to some builders whom
they considered to be their "better builders .

tl
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It is well settled that the testimony of a witness,
whether that witness is interested or disinterested, cannot be
arbitrarily disregarded.

Guinand v. Walton, 25 Utah 2d 253,

480 P 2d 137 (1971); Corl!=Y v. Corley, 92 N.M. 716, 594 P 2d
1172 (1979).

In addition, rejection of the testimony of interestec

witnesses which is corroborated by a disinterested witness amounts
to arbitrary action. Ft. Mohave ·Farms, Inc. v. Dunlap, 393 P 2d
662, 96 Ariz. 193 (1964).
Appellants maintain that before the trial court could
find that no guarantee was made, it had to completely reject the
testimony of appellants, which testimony is credible and uncontradicted by any other witness.

There is also some evidence, provided

by the only other party to the contract negotiations which corroborates appellants assertions. ·Appellants, therefore, submit that
the great weight of the ev£dence (much more than a mere preponderance) establishes that Vantage represented to appellants
that should they purchase the

bui~ding

lots from Vantage, con-

struction financing for those lots was guaranteed through Deseret
Federal.
The high preponderance of evidence in favor of a guarantee
is further supported by Vantage's answer to appellants amended
complaint.

This is sue is discussed in detail under Point II

in th

bri.ef but it is important to note here that Vantage admitted, in
its answer, that construction loans were guaranteed to appellants.
(See Amended Complaint paragraphs 3 and 4, and see defendant's
answer, paragraph one)

Vantage never did amend its corrplaint and

therefore, this admission remains as a judicial admission..
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It has

been held that admissions of fact in a pleading are normally
conclusive on the party making the admission.

Yates v. Large,

284 Or. 217, 585 P 2d 697 (1978); McCormickonEvidence 630, Section
262 (2d ed. 1972).

During closing arguments, counsel for Vantage

indicated that it was an error on his part to admit in his
answer, that Vantage guaranteed the construction loans.

However,

even if Vantage had amended its answer, the previous admission
can still be used as evidence to establish appellant's case.
Yates ·v .. Large., supra.

This admission, coupled with the abundant

testimony that Vantage did make a guarantee of construction
financing to appellants constitutes a very high species. of evidence.
American..;First Title v. First Federal, 415 P 2d 930 (Okl. 1966)
The trial Court's finding that appellants failed to establish an enforceable agreement to provide construction financing
goes against the great weight of
reversable error.

thE~

evidence: and constitutes a

As discussed infra, a finding that Vantage

made a guarantee to appellants, irrespective of the enforceability
of that guarantee would compel a rescission of the sales contracts
for the FOUR {4) lots sued upon.
Appellants provided substantial evidence that Vantage
did make statements to them which amounted to a guarantee of
construction financing.

In contrast, Vantage provided no evidence

that such statements were not made.
Court of Utah., the evidence so

11

In the language of the Supreme

clearly preponderates" against the

trial Court 1 s finding that such a firlding amounts to a manifest
injustice.

Hatch v. ·Bastian, supra, 'rhe evidence concerning the
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guarantee of construction financing is of sufficient quality
and substance that all reasonable minds would conclude that
Vantage, through Doug Boulton did make the statements constituting a guarantee of contruction financing.

When evidence that a

particular -fact exists is of this quality and substance, thE! trial
court is compelled to make a finding that said fact does exist.
De Vas v.

Noble~

13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P 2d 290 (1962).

In view of the foregoing, the trial court's holding that
appellants had to establish an enforceable agreement of Vantage to
provide construction financing and its finding that appellants
did not establish this enforceable agreement, constitutes a
reversable error.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL. COURT ERRED .·IN .·FINDING .THAT. VANTAGE DID
NOT GUARANTEE ·coNSTRUCTTON .-FINANCING WHEN VANTAGE
ADMITTED. THE . GUARANTEE TN ·rTS. ANSWER .·AND NO AMENDMENT TO THE 'ANSWER.WAS.MADE AT ANY TIME.
Paragraph three of appellants amended complaint alleges

that appellants agreed to purchase certain building lots frcm
Vantage~

Paragraph three also alleges that this agreement was

"condi.tioned upon VANTAGE CORPORATION'S guarantee of a construction loan through DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN for each of
sai.d lots."

(See amended complaint paragraph three).

Paragraph four of appellants amended complaint also
alleges that the "down payment, interest payments, and purchase
were conditioned upon VANTAGE CORPORATION'S guarantee of construction loans on said lots."

{See amended complaint paragraph

four).

-18-
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Vantage answered the allegations contained in paragraph
1, 2, 3, and 4 of appellants amended complaint as follows:
"Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 1, 2, 3, and 4 of plaintiffs' complaint."
(defendant's answer, paragraph one)
Without question, Vantage has admitted that construction
financing was guaranteed to appellants.

Vantage did not amend

its answer at any time during pre-trial procedures or during trial.
A factual admission in a pleading filed with the Court is
a judicial admission.

The weight to be given such admissions

varies between jurisdictions but they are: always given significant
weight.

Irt Yates

v. Large, 284 Or. 217, 585 P 2d 697 (1978),

the Supreme Court of Oregon explained

the conclusive naturE-: of

judicial admissions as follows:

An admi.ssion of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission and, as such, is normally conclusive
on the party making such an admission.
The Supreme Court of Arizona has also held that when a
fact is alleged in the complaint, and then admitted in the answer,
this admission binds the defendant and is conclusive as to the
admitted fact..

Paul Schoonover, Inc. v. Ram Construction, ·rnc.,

129 Ariz. 204, 630 P 2d 27
During closing

{1981)~

arguments~

Vantage's admission that the

agreement between the parties was conditioned upon a guarantee
of construction financing was pointed out to the Court by counsel
for appellants {Tr . 2d pp. 2, .3, 12).

Specifically, counsel read

the pertinent portiDns of the amended complaint and answer.
however~

did not elicit a response frcm counsel for Vantage.

This
On

rebuttal argument, counsel for appellants again brought attention
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to Vantage's admission and asserted:

"

in regards to this,

the guarantee, first of all it's admitted in the pleadings, and
I believe it's not in issue because of that." (Tr. 2d p. 12).
After this second reference to the admission by Vantage that
guarantees of construction financing were made counsel for
Vantage did respond:
Mr. Garrett: Your Honor, I just have one thing
. . . I certainly didn't intend in the pleadings to
admit any such guarantee. If I did, it was an
error on my part, and ask to re-do the pleadings
on that reason, (Tr. 2d. p. 14).
This statement may amount to a motion to amend but
the Court did not respond to this statement and the pleadings
were not amended.
Even if Vantage had amended its answer to exclude the
admission of guaranteed construction loans, such alill amendment
would no~t eliminate the evidentiary effect of the prior admission.
Upon filing of an amended answer, however,
any admission of fact in the superseded answer
is no longer a judicial admission, but is admissible as evidence to establish plaintiff's case.
. . . In other words a superseded pleading can
be used as an "evidentiary admission," but is no<
longer conclusive upon.the party making such an
admission.
'Yates ·v .· Large, 585 P 2d 697, 700.
r

•

Thus., until the admission is removed through an amendment,
it will remain as a judicial admission and is conclusive on Vantage.,

The Trial Court's finding that Vantage did not make the

guarantee of construction financing is in direct conflict with the
Vantage's

admission~

The Court's finding is also in direct

conflict with the great weight of the evidence.

The erroneous

nature of the Court 1 s finding constitutes a reversible error and
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-

compels a reversal.

POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED .·IN. REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO
PROVE ALL THE 'ELEMENTS.OF FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM.OF MISREPRESENTATION.

In Utah, and in may other jurisdictions, a contract,
including a contract for the sale of land, is subject to rescission
where there has been a material misrepresentation which induced
the contract.

Under this doctrine, proof of all the essential

elements of actionable fraud is not necessary.

The only elements

which must be established are a misrepresentation as to a material
aspect of the agreement which is relied upon by the plaintiff.

A

review of the case law whi.ch supports this doctrine and the application of the doctrine to the abundant evidence of a guarantee
(supra) will clearly establish that appellants are entitled to
rescission and restitution.
The case which gives the clearest statement of this doctrine is Lehnhardt v. City of Phoertix, 105 Ariz. 142, 460 P 2d 637
(1969)..

There, a -,property owner within the City of Phoenix received

by mail a quit claim deed and a sketch prepared by the City.

These

documents were accompanied by a letter requesting the land owner
to dedicate a portion of her property to the city for roadway
purposes.

The quit claim deed was accurate but the sketch,

which was intended to illustrate that portion of the property
which would be dedi.cated, was erroneous.

The quit claim deed

actually conveyed 4,131 square feet more than the sketch indicated.
The City was

una~are

that the sketch did not correspond to the deed

and did not intend to deceive the land owner ..
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Several months later the landowner discovered the actual
amount of property she had dedicated to the City.

Alleging

misrepresentation, she brought an action to rescind the transactio1
and cancel the deed.

The City of Phoenix prevailed at trial but

the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed and remanded with instructiot
to enter judgment in favor of the landowner.
basis for recovery as

The Court stated the

follows~

Plaintiff contends that a transaction induced
by the material though innocent misrepresentation
of a party is voidable against that party. We agree
It appears to be well-e~tablished law that
a cl~im for rescission, as oppsed to a claim for
damages, may be granted when "innocent" as well as
fraudulent misrepresentations are made, and that
accordingly, proof of each of the nine elements of
actionable fraud is not essential in a rescission
action . . . Conceding the absence of fraud, plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to rescission because
of the representation of the city, its falsity, its
materiality, and the fact that it was the inducing
cause for her execution of the quit claim deed.
In support of this doctrine the Court cited cases from
Oregon., New Mexico and Oklahoma.
Watkins v. Grady, 438 P 2d 491 (Ikl. 1968) and Souza v.
Jackson, 472 P 2d 272 !Or& 1970) provide further examples of the
application of this doctrine.

In Watkins, a land owner agreed to

grant an easement to a water distri_ct for the purpose of constructing a flood control dam.

The water district however, misrepre·

sented to the land owner the actual conditions which would exist
upon completion of the dam.

Although the misrepresentation was

"innocent", the court held in favor of the landowner and cancelled
the easement.

The Court stated:

"Misrepresentation of material facts, although
innocently made, if acted on by the otiher party to
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to his detriment, will constitute a sufficient
ground for rescission and cancellation in equity."
In Souza v. Jackson, supra, the purchaser of a home and
surrounding property brought an action for rescission based on
misrepresentation.

The vendor represented to the purchaser that

a well on the property produced sufficient water to supply household needs.

This representation however, was erroneous since the

well produced almost no water.

The Court held for the vendor but

the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed with directions to enter a
decree granting rescission..

The Court stated:

The tt.ial court found that the representation
that the well produced three gallons per minute
was innocently made. However, the rule is firmly
established that a material misrepresentation
although innocently made may be grounds for rescission.
Robirtson v. Katz, 94 N.M. 134, 610 P 2d 201 (1980) and
Gardner v .. Meiling,, 280 Or .. 665., 572 P 2d 1012 (1977) apply this
same doctrine to grant rescission of land contractso
The doctrine pronounced in ·Lehnhardt v. City ·of Phoertix,
supra, and in the other cases cited above is also applicable in
Utah.

Although not stated in express terms, this Court

appli~d

same rule i.rt Smith -v; Pearniain, 548 P 2d 1269 (Utah 1976)..
the plaintiff purchased a

~uilding

the

There

which was being used as a duplex.

Although the real estate: agent represented to the plaintiff that
this use of the property was authorized, it was discovered, after
the sale., that this use violated the local zoning ordinances.
As to the nature of the misrepresentation, the evidence
demonstrated that the real estate agent believed the use was
authorized and that he did not indulge in bad

-23-

faith~

However,
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because of the misrepresentation the plaintiff elected to rescind
the sale contract.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of

plaintiff and defendant appealed.
On appeal, defendant argued that the facts did not establish the grounds necessary for rescission.

Defendant argued that

the quality of proof required is the same proof required to establish actionable fraud.

The Supreme Court disagreed.

Appellant's counsel urges that the facts here
are insufficient to satisfy the necessary grounds
for rescission, and the quality of proof interdicted
in Pace v. Parrish, {to which we refer without
necessity to repeat its language here), with which
urgence we are compelled to disagree.
As the Court is well aware, Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141,
247 P 2d 273 (1952), is frequently cited to explain all of the
elements of fraud.

In addition to the essential elements of

actionable fraud, Pace

v . Parrish, supra, sets forth the standard

of proof which must be met in·order to establish fraud.

In

Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P 2d 873 (Utah, 1978) this Court cited
Pace v .. Parrish, supra, for the proposition that fraud must be
proved by "clear and convincing evidence".

This is the "Quality

of Proof" referred to in Smith v. Pearmain, supra, which was
rejected as the quality of proof required to rescind a contract
based on a material misrepresentation.
In the case at bar, appellants provided substantial
evidence that statements were made to them by Vantage that construction financing was guaranteed since they purchased the lots
from Vantage.

No evidence was presented at trial which directly

conflicts with thi.s evidence.

Appellants also testified that they

relied upon these statements {Tr. p. 60) and that without such
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representation, they would not have entered the sales contracts
(Tr. p. 65).

Whether or not the guarantee was an enforceable

agreement is entirely irrelevant.
The representation that construction loans were guaranteed, coupled with appellants reliance thereon constitute grounds
for recission and

restitution~

Appellants were not required to

prove all of the elements of fraud nor prove misrepresentation by
clear and convincing evidence ..
Although the trial court did not expressly rule on
appellants claim of misrepresentation, it is apparent that the
Court required proof of all the elements of fraud by clear and
convincing proof {Tr. p. 123).

It is also apparent that the

distinction between appellants allegation of fraud and their claim of
misrepresentation was made to the trial court (Tr. p ~ 5 and Tr.
2nd p. 4).

With regards to this aspect of appellant's case,

it is in direct opposition to the legal stance adopted by the
Court in Smith v. Pearmain_, supra, to require proof of the elements
of fraud by clear and convincing proof.

The trial court erred

in holding appellants to thi.s quantity and quality of proof.
This error alone requires a reversal.
POINT IV..

THE. TRIAL. COURT ERRED .TN -"FINDING TI:IERE WAS ·suFFICIENT "AND .·-PROPER _··PART' 'PERFORMANCE, . WRITINGS ,- AND.
TESTIMONY 'TO REMOVE THE'- -oRAL ".AGREEMENT FROM 'THE
STATUTE OF 'FRAUDS.
Appellants alleged in their amended complaint, and Van-

tage admitted in its answer thereto, {See amended complaint para ...
graph 3, and defendant s answer, paragraph 1) that 'ttthe agreement
1

between appellants and Vantage was made orally.

Both appellants
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testified at trial that no written contracts of sale or any other
written memoranda which might have reduced the oral agreement to
writing were ever signed by either appellant (Tr. pp. 23. 15, 17,
73).

Also, no written document, signed or unsigned, containing

the terms of the agreement was produced at trial.

Without questio'.

an oral agreement to convey land is unenforceable under the Utah
Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
Amended.

However, at the close of all the evidence and closing

statements, the trial court stated:

"I have some doubt that--::::t:he

statute of frauds under the circumstances of this case is appli--cable at

all~

But if it is, then I think that the part-performance

did take it out of the statute."· {Tr. p. 123).

Thj_s statement

was transcribed into the Court's finding of fact number 13, which
states:
There was suffici.ent evi.dence before the Court
of payment of the down payment on the purchase price,
whi.ch was in the form of a writing, and a letter signed
by one of the plainti_ffs at the time interest was paid
and the actual payment of interest and the full payment of the principal and interest on three of the
lots to show that the statute of frauds did not apply
and that further testimony concerning the terms of
sale was accepted by the court as proper.
Appellants maintain that the courts oral statement and
its finding of fact number 13 are

erroneous~

A brief review of

the statute of frauds and the doctrine of part performance establish that the facts and circumstances of this case do not bring
the oral agreement between appellants and Vantage out of the Utah
Statute of
A.

Frauds~

Stattite of Frauds
The statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated
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(1953) requires every agreement to convey land to be in writing.
Such an agreement is not always void or voidable but "can properly
be described as unenforceable . . . inasmuch as the ordinary legal
remedies are unavailable."

2 Corbin on Contracts 279, pp. 20-21

(1950).
At trial, the only written documents relating to the
agreement to purchase the building lots which were introduced
into evidence were the checks for the down payment and interest,
Vantage's accounting of those payments and a letter from one
appellant to Vantage.(Tr. pp. 29, 66, 99, 102).

There was some

testimony as to an earnest money agreement but most 0f this
testimony was stricken

{Tr~

pp. 110, 121, 122).

In order to remove the agreement from the Statute of
Frauds these writings must contain certain provisions..

It is a

well established principal of law that written memoranda, which
are relied upon to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must contain all
of the essential terms and provisions of the contract..

Birdzell v.

Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P 2d 578 (1952); Baugh
v. Logan

City~

perties, Inc.,

27 Utah 2d 291, 495 P 2d 814 (1972); Ziort's Pro-

v. Holt, 538 P 2d 1319 (1975).

This basic state=

ment has been qualified to some extent in Guin.and

v. Walton,

27 Utah 2d 196, 450 P 2d 467 {1969), appeal after remand 25 Utah
2d 253, 480 P 2d 137 fl971)..

There thi_s comnt held that a written

instrument will bring an agreement out of the statute of frauds if
the interest is granted or declared by the writing and if the
writing is subscribed to by the party to be charged.
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Under the rule stated in Birdzell v. Utah Oil, supra,
and under the rule stated in Guinand v. Walton, supra, the written
instruments produced at trial do not br:i.ng the oral agreement
between appellants and Vantage out of the Statute of Frauds.
The checks and the letter (defendant's Exhibit 5) contain signa- tures but none of these documents refer to the essential elements
of a contract to convey land.

The most important contractural

element which is missing from these documents is a grant or declara·
tion of an interest in property.

Without such a grant or declara-

tion the writings cannot be sufficient to take the oral agreement
out of the Statute of

Frauds~

The absence of any contractural terms regarding the
property interest conveyed, and the essential nature of such
terms, is emphasized by the Trial Court's reference to a Uniform
Real Estate Contract.

In response to counsel's argument that there

is no evidence of terms which would give Vantage the right to
foreclose on the property,, the court stated:
THE COURT:

Well, that 1 s true, but uniform real estate

contracts have this provision in them that they maybe foreclosed
as a mortgage (Tr. 2d p. 6).
MR HARDING:

But there is no evidence of any uniform

real estate contract.
THE COURT:

That is true.

But I think, inherently, I

think the Court has inherent equitable powers in this kind of a
case if it wanted to order a foreclosure (Tr. 2d pp. 6-7).
Thus,, the Court felt compelled to determine the property
interests held by each party by referring to a standard uniform
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real estate contract.
B.

Part Performance
When partial performance is relied upon to avoid the

Statute of Frauds, the nature of that performance must be closely
scrutinized.

This close review of the acts asserted as part

performance is applied with great care and is used only to prevent
the Statute of Frauds from being used to perpetrate a Fraud.
Ravorina v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P 2d 570 (1953).
Finding number 13 indicates. that the performance which
supposedly removed the agreement from the effects of the statute of
Frauds consists of 1) partial payment of the purchase price, and
2) actual payment of the full interest and purchase price on three
of the lots.

Vantage however, cannot rely upon either one of

these instances of part performance.
First, appel1ants have not attempted to rescind the
sales contracts covering the three lots which were sl.old to third
parties.

When full payment for these lots was received, Vantage

performed its obligation urider those contracts.

Since Vantage

did not apply the proceeds of the sales (of the three lots) proportionately against the unpaid ba1ance for all seven lots, they
cannot now claim that ·Jtthe original agreement contained only one
contract.

Thus, fu11 performance, by both parties, of the con-

tracts for lots 28, 49 and 58., does not constitute partial performance of the sales contracts covering lots 18, 19, 34 and 35.
Second., as to the contracts for lots 18, 19, 34 and 35,
Vantage has done nothing which constitutes partial performanceo
When one party seeks to remove an oral contract from the Statute
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of Frauds, that party may rely only upon its own part performance
and not upon the partial performance of others. This principle
of law arises from the basic purpose of the doctrine of part performance.

In Schwedes v. Romain, 587 P 2d 388 (Mont. 1978), the

Supreme Court of Montana cited 73 Am. Jur. 2d P 38, to explain this
legal principle.
Since the basis of the doctrine of part performance
is to prevent a fraud upon the plaintiffs, it is true
as a general proposition, that if a party who resists
the enforcement of a contract chooses not to stand on
what he has done under and in pursuance of it, the
other party cannot be aided by it.
This same principle has been followed by the Supreme Court
of Utah in Utah Mercur Gold Mirt; Co.

v.

103 Utah 249, 134 P 2d 1094 (1934).

There, citing Besse v. McHenry,

Herschel Gold Min.

~'

89 Mont. 520, 300 P 199 (1931), the Court stated:
Part performance which will avoid the statute
of frauds may consist of any act which puts
party performing in such a position that nonperformance by other would constitute fraud.
Thus, where one party has not done anything which can be
construed as partial performance of an oral contract to convey
land, it cannot rely upon the doctrine of part performance to
avoid the statute of frauds.
Third, even if Vantage could rely on it, mere payment
of a portion of the purchase price is not an act of part performance
which will remove an oral contract from the Statute of Frauds.
Pugh v .. Gilbreath, 571 P 2d 1241 _(Okl. App. 1977); Del Rio Land,
Inc .. v. Havmont, 118 Ariz 1, 574 P 2d 469 (1977); 73 Am. Jur. 2d
66, Statute of Frauds, Section 436.
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As early as 1890 the Supreme Court of Utah recognized
this precise rule in Maxfield v. ·west, 6 Utah 327, 23 P 754 (1890).
There the court stated,

0

the fact that a part of the purchase

money had been paid was not of itself sufficient in equity to take
the parol contract out of the statutes."
The reason for this rule is that ordinarily, the relief
obtained through the doctrine of part performance is specific
performance of the contract.

This remedy is not necessary where

only money has changed hands since the equity court can easily
restore the status quo by ordering the vendor to return the
money.

Pugh v. 'Gilbreath, supra.
In Holmgren

v. Ballard, 534 P 2d 611 (Utah 1975) the

Supreme Court of Utah outlined four types of acts, all of which
should be considered to determine whether sufficient part performance has been accomplished.

One of the four acts in payment

of a valuable consi.deration.
Similar to Holmgren. v .: ·Ballard,, supra, is Powers v.
Hastings_, 93 Wash. 2d 709, 612 P 2d 371 (1980).

There the court

explained that part performance has three elements; 1) possession,
2) payments and 3) improvements..

If the plaintiff has taken

possession of land under an oral contract., has made payments and
has made substantial improvements on the land, he is enti.tled
to the benefit of the doctrine of part performance.

The Court

held that sufficient part performance can be established where
two of the elements exist ..
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In sum the oral statement by the trial court (Tr. p. 123)
and firlding number 13 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are erroneous as a matter of law for FOUR basic reasons. 1) thE
Statute of Frauds does apply to this oral agreement; 2) the

writin~

offered at trial are insuffici_ent to remove the agreement from the
Statute of Frauds; 3) Vantage cannot rely on the part performance
of appellants and, even if they could, part payment alone is insufficient to remove an Agreement from the Statute of Frauds; and
4) Full performance of three of the sales contracts does not constitute partial performance on the remaining four.
The erroneous conclusions of the trial court described
above require a reversal of the Trial Court's holding.

Appellants

elected to rescind, they gave proper notice of rescission,

and

when Vantage refused to return appellants' money, they brought
this action ..
POINT V.

THE TRIAL COURT 'ERRED-IN.REFUSING_TQ_FIND THAT
'VANTAGE HAS BEEN 'UNJUSTLY.ENRICHED AS A.RESULT OF
'THE 'TRANSACTIONS 'GIVING 'RISE TO 'THIS LAW SUIT.
A cause of action for unjust enrichment arises whenever

money or property has been placed in one person's possession under
circumstances that in equity and good conscience, he ought not to
retain.

'Heaton ·v .. Imus,, 9.3 Wash. 2d 249, 608 P 2d 631 (1980).

Stated another way, by the Supreme Court of Utah> unjust enrichment
occurs whenever a person has and r.etains money or benefits which int
justice and equity belong to another.

L'& A Drywall v. Whitmore,

608 P 2d 626 (Utah 1980).
Whether viewed in light of the Utah rule or in light of
the Washington rule, the circumstances of the present case give
rise
to a cause of action based on unjust ----..: _.,_ ____ ...._
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Here, the appellant's paid a down payment and interest
payments to Vantage.

According to the agreement between the par-

ties these payments were applied to the purchase of SEVEN (7)
building lots owned by Vantage.
payments.:~efr:ants

However, in exchange for these

received nothing from Vantage.

No deeds, trust

deeds or trust deed notes were signed by appellants or Vantage
and thus, no interest in the property passed to appellants.

At

this time, Vantage still holds title to the property and has
retained appellants down payment and interest payments, but has
not performed its obligations under the original agreement.

On

the other hand, appellants have substantially performed their
contractural obligations, suffered a loss in doing so, and, as a
result of Trial Court's holding, are precluded from recovering
that loss.
The inequiti.es in this case are blatant.

Vantage has

retained money which in justice and equity belongs to appellants.
Vantage has therefore been unjustly enriched at the expense of
appellants and should, in equity and good conscience, be required
to return the· down payment and interest to appellants.
POINT VI.

THE TRIAL. COURT. 'ERRED TN .'REFUSING. TO . FIND THAT
VANTAGE. BREACHE'D .·THE ·sALES CONTRACTS ON .THE FOUR
LOTS SUED 'UPON BY APPELLANTS.
As demonstrated supra, the great weight of the evidence

at trial establishes that v·antage did in fact guarantee construction financing to appellants.

Therefore, if the agreement to pur-

chase the SEVEN (7) building lots created binding, enforceable sales
contracts, the terms of those contracts must include the guarantee
of construction financing.
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Appellants testified that the guarantee of construction
loans was an important factor which induced them to enter the
agreement. (Tr. p. 65).

Therefore, the refusal of Deseret Federal

to provide appellants with construction loans for the lots constituted a material and fundamental breach of the sales contracts.
A review of the case law establishes that appellants are entitled
to rescission and restitution as a result of Vantage's breach.
It is well established that a material breach which
destroys or vitiates the entire purpose for entering into the
contract gives rise to a right to rescind
Slingerland~

th~

contract.

Cady v.

514 P 2d 114 7 (Wyo. 19 73) ; ·polyglycoat v. Holcomb,

591 P 2d 449 (Utah 1979) ;· Abrams v. Firtartcial, 13 Utah 2d 343, 3 74
P 2d 309 (1962).

A good ·example oL_this_ is found in Lane v. Bis-

ceglia, 15 Ariz. App. 269, 488 P 2d 474 (1971).

There the

appellants agreed to purchase certain real property from the
appellees.

As part of the consideration, appellants agreed to

assume an existing 6% mortgage on the property.

The appellants

placed $5,000.00 in escrow as earnest money and the appellees prepared the necessary instruments.

However, the existing mortgage

allowed the mortgagee to increase the interest rate upon assumption.
When the appellants were informed of the mortgagee's intent to
raise the rate to 6 3]4% they refused to complete the transaction.
Thereafter,, a law suit was brought by appellants "to rescind the
contract and restore the parties to the stat.ms quo ante, i.e . ,
return the $5~000~00 to the purchasers."
Although the higher interest rate would result in an
increase of only $3.00 per month, the Court determined that by
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requiring the purchaser to assume the higher rate, the seller
materially breached the contract.

This breach gave the pur-

chaser the right to rescind the contract and recover their
earnest money.

The Court further stated that the motive of a

purchaser in rescinding the contract is immaterial where there
has been a material breach.
The Arizona Court's holding in Lane v. Bisceglia, supra,
is consistent with the present Utah Supreme Court holding in
Polyglycoat v. Holcomb, 591 P 2 449 (Utah 1979).

Although this

case did not involve a contract for the sale of real property,
this Court clearly stated the rule of law which is directly
applicable and controlling in the case at bar.
As a general proposition, a party to a contract
has a right of rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages
where there has been a material breach of the contract by the other party. What constitutes so
serious a breach as to justify rescission is not
easily reduced to precise statement, but certainly
a failure of performance which "defeats the very
object of the contract" or "is of such prime importance that the contract would not have been
made if default in that particular had been contemplated" is a material failure. Polyglycoat v.
Holcomb, 591 P 2d 449, 451.
Appellants testified that they purchased the lots for
the purpose of building homes ttthereon (Tr. p .. 13).

Appellants

knew that the construction of homes would require financing and
they agreed to purchase the lots only upon a guarantee that
construction financir1g would be provided..

This guarantee was a

material provision of the original agreement.

Therefore, when

appellants were not even permitted to apply for construction f inancing at Deseret Federal, Vantage failed to perform a material
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obligation under the agreement.

This failure to perform defeated

"the very object of the contract" and compels a reversal of the
Trial Court's holding.
CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons stated above, appellants respectfully
request this Court to reverse the Trial Court's Judgment and
require the Trial Court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the sum of $9,371.80 plus
costs of Court and interest at the legal rate.
Respectfully submitted.
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